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Criminal Procedure
By WILLIAM H. FORTUNE*
INTRODUCTION
This Survey covers significant criminal procedure decisions
of the Kentucky appellate courts for the period July 1, 1980, to
July 1, 1982. It does not include cases construing the penal code
or noteworthy decisions in the Kentucky law of evidence. The
author has selected the most important criminal procedure cases
for treatment in the text; a number of significant cases are sum-
marized in footnotes.'
. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1961, J.D. 1964, University of
Kentucky.
1 The Supreme Court of Kentucky rendered a number of important decisions not
otherwise discussed in this Survey, e.g., Commonwealth v. Key, 633 S.W.2d 55 (Ky.
1982) (evidence in the hands of the county attorney may be imputed to the commonwealth
attorney for purposes of the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence) (dictum); Schooley v.
Commonwealth, 627 S.W.2d 576 (Ky. 1982) (defendant must make a showing that disclo-
sure of the name of an informant will be helpful in the trial on the merits before disclosure
will be ordered); Commonwealth v. Brown, 619 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1981) (prosecutors and
courts have no inherent power to grant immunity from prosecution); Tabor v. Common-
wealth, 613 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1981) (prosecution must prove the voluntariness of a confes-
sion by a preponderance of the evidence); Sussman v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 608
(Ky. 1980) (in order to have standing to challenge the search of an apartment one must
have more than a right of access-application of Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980); Commonwealth v. Donovan, 610 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. 1980) (an order requiring ex-
change of witness lists does not violate the privilege against self incrimination even though
it does violate the criminal rules).
Other important cases include Commonwealth v. Hamblem, 628 S.W.2d 345
(Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (return of an indictment in felony cases places sole jurisdiction in the
circuit court and terminates the jurisdiction of the district court); Turlock v. Common-
wealth, 620 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (rule requiring explanation of potential con-
flict and written waiver in case of multiple representation by attorney is mandatory and
violation requires reversal even though no prejudice can be shown); C.E.H. v. Common-
wealth, 619 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (order transferring juvenile case to circuit
court is not appealable); Thurman v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.2d 803 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980) (thirteenth juror, who had been discharged from the panel after the completion of
final arguments, could not be recalled when a juror became ill during deliberations);
Commonwealth v. Cornelius, 606 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (statute granting
courts power to parole misdemeanants is unconstitutional since parole is inherently an
executive function).
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I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Auto Inventory Searches
In 1979, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Wagner v.
Commonwealth,2 one of the most significant search and seizure
cases ever decided by the state's highest court. Although there is
some debate over Wagner's3 exact meaning, two things are clear:
1) the Court rested its decision on section 10 of the Kentucky
Constitution, 4 rather than the fourth amendment, because it dis-
agreed with the United States Supreme Court's decision in South
Dakota v. Oppermari;5 and 2) the Court intended to clarify the
circumstances under which police could impound and search a
car. 6 The Kentucky Court said that a vehicle may be impounded
without a warrant in only four situations:
1) The owner or permissive user consents to the'impound-
ment;
2) The vehicle, if not removed, constitutes a danger to other
persons or property or the public safety and the owner or permis-
sive user cannot reasonably arrange for alternate means of
removal;
3) The police have probable cause to believe both that the
vehicle constitutes an instrumentality or fruit of a crime and that
absent immediate impoundment the vehicle will be removed by
a third party, or
4) The police have probable cause to believe both that the
vehicle contains evidence of a crime and that absent immediate
impoundment the evidence will be lost or destroyed. 7
2 581 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1979).
3 Compare Note, Search and Seizure, 68 Ky. L.J. 611, 631 (1980-81) (arguing that
Wagner makes it clear that warrants are required to search cars in Kentucky, absent exi-
gent circumstances) with Givan, Notes on Wagner v. Commonwealth, KY. BENCH AND
BAR, July 1981, at 11, 12 (arguing that Wagner should not be construed as limiting the
authority of police to make warrantlessrvehicular searches in non-inventory situations).
4 See 581 S.W.2d at 356.
' 428 U.S. 364 (1976). Opperman held that a routine police search of an impounded
car that disclosed marijuana in the glove compartment did not constitute a violation of
fourth amendment rights.
6 See 581 S.W.2d at 356-57.
7 Id. at 356 (footnotes omitted).
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The Court went on to say that an impounded vehicle could
be inventoried: 1) pursuant to a warrant based on probable
cause; 2) with the consent of the owner or permissive user; or 3)
upon substantial necessities grounded upon public safety justifi-
cations.8 The Court, however, also said it was reserving a deter-
mination of what circumstances would permit an inventory of an
impounded vehicle whose owner could not be contacted. 9
In Cardwell v. Commonwealth,0 the court of appeals dealt
with the question reserved in Wagner-the question of when an
impounded vehicle can be inventoried where the owner is absent
and cannot be contacted." In Cardwell, the defendant had bur-
glarized a house and put the stolen property in the trunk of his
car. He collided with another motorist and fled the scene with
the other driver in pursuit. He then lost control of his car, and it
turned over several times, coming to rest alongside and perhaps
protruding onto the highway. The defendant was injured and his
car damaged. Before the defendant was taken to the hospital, he
told the investigating trooper that his father would tow the car
with a wrecker from Louisville, which was several hours from
the accident scene. Believing, however, that the car was a safety
hazard, the trooper summoned a local wrecker to impound the
car. At some point the trooper noted that the trunk lid, although
down, was not latched and its lock was missing. Having made
the decision to impound the vehicle, the trooper decided to look
in the unlocked trunk "for valuables ... because the car was go-
ing to be towed in."'12 When the wrecker arrived, the trooper
opened the trunk and found the fruits of the earlier burglary. By
this time the defendant had been removed to the hospital.
8 Id. at 357.
9 Id.
10 639 S.W.2d 549 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), discretionary review denied, (Ky. Oct. 5,
1982). Pack v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1980), decided by the Supreme
Court during the Survey period, was merely an application of Wagner. In Pack, the offi-
cer made an arrest for driving while under the influence. The car was impounded and
subsequently searched for evidence of a crime that the driver and a cohort were suspected
of committing. The impoundment was justified on the theory that the cohort might de-
stroy evidence if the car was left at the scene; the search was justified by application of the
plain view doctrine.
" 639 S.W.2d at 552.
12 Id. at 550.
1982-83]
KENTUCKY LAW JoutNAL
The court first considered the legality of the impoundment of
the vehicle in light of the defendant's desire that his father get the
car. The court had no difficulty in upholding the impoundment
under the second Wagner situation-the car constituted a hazard
on the highway and it was not reasonable to wait for the father to
arrive from Louisville, some 100 miles away. 13
The court next considered the difficult question of the open-
ing of the trunk. In what must be regarded as dictum, the court
first suggested that lifting the lid of the trunk might not be a
search for purposes of the fourth amendment and section 10 of
the Kentucky Constitution, because the trooper did not have a
"'police mentality," that is, a suspicion that a body or guns were
in the trunk.14 The court quoted from Nichols v. Common-
wealth,15 a case which does not support this proposition. 16 To
suggest that the constitutional protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures apply only when the police are looking for
evidence of a crime would drastically circumscribe those protec-
tions. The United States Supreme Court has not drawn this dis-
tinction 7 in earlier cases or in Opperman.8 Within Kentucky,
City of Danville v. Dawson9 clearly holds that an officer's be-
nign motive does not change a search to a non-search.
After suggesting that no search occurred, the court went on
to hold that the search was, in any event, justified by the implied
consent of the owner. The court reasoned that because the defen-
dant was on his way to the hospital, the trooper had done him a
favor by opening the trunk.20 While seeming absurd, this reason-
ing is consistent with Wagner and Justice Marshall's dissent in
Opperman. 21 Assuming that the defendant could not reasonably
131d. at 551.
14 Id.
Is 408 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1966).
16 In Nichols, the Court was concerned with whether the contents of a bag were in
plain view. Finding that they were not, the Court held that the lower court erred in refus-
ing to suppress the evidence.
17 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1978).
18 428 U.S. at 370 n.6.
19 528 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1975).
20 639 S.W.2d at 552. This "favor" resulted in a 15-year penitentiary sentence.
21 428 U.S. at 393 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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be contacted, was it reasonable for the trooper to suppose that
the defendant would want the trunk opened to check for valu-
ables? Arguably, on the facts of Cardwell, such a supposition
was warranted; the trunk could not be secured because it had no
lock. Thus, the police could not safeguard the contents by lock-
ing the trunk. Cardwell seems to be the exception to the rule pre-
suming against consent to search and clearly does not modify the
general requirement in Kentucky that police safeguard the con-
tents of a vehicle by locking the doors.
The defect in Cardwell is the court's assumption that the
owner could not reasonably be contacted. The facts set out in the
opinion reflect that the owner-defendant was at the scene prior
to the search and was on his way to the hospital when the search
occurred.2 No reason is given as to why the trooper believed he
could not delay the search until he had contacted the owner.
Wagner requires an explanation of a failure to contact the
owner,O and Cardwell contains no such explanation.
B. Search Incident to Arrest
In Brock v. Commonwealth,2 the court of apeals upheld, as
incident to arrest, the search of a lunchbox belonging to Larry
Brock found within the passenger compartment of a van follow-
ing the arrest of the driver, a man named Linders. The court ap-
plied the recently-announced rule of New York v. Belton25 that
"articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger
compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not
inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item,"' " and that the pas-
senger compartment and all items within it may be searched inci-
dent to arrest. The United States Supreme Court in Belton opted
for a "bright line" approach to a common situation-an arrest on
the highway accompanied by fear that weapons or evidence are
2 639 S.W.2d at 550, 552.
23 581 S.W.2d at 357.
627 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).




within the car-to establish a rule which the majority believe is
easy to understand and apply. Simply stated, the rule permits the
passenger compartment and all items within it to be searched
without a showing that the arrestee could in fact gain access to
the item seized.-"
In addition to its significance as the first Kentucky case to
apply Belton, Brock is noteworthy for two other reasons. First,
the court declined an invitation to find that the Kentucky Consti-
tution affords protection to the individual in addition to that af-
forded by the fourth amendment.2 Second, the court applied the
rationale of search incident to arrest even though the opinion
suggests that the officers thought they were searching pursuant to
the consent of the driver, Linders, and that they had no fear that
he would try to grab something from the van.29 By contrast, the
officer in Belton was faced with a volatile situation in which he
believed himself to be in danger. 30 In Belton, the Supreme Court
held that adhering to a rule which is measured after the fact by a
judge's view of an arrestee's actual ability to reach an object
within a car is inconsistent with the deterrent purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule. The Court did not, however, hold it unnecessary
to determine whether an officer's search is motivated by fear.
Since Chimel v. California,3' the exception for searches incident
27 d. at 460-61. The case for a bright line approach to fourth amendment adjudica-
tion is well stated in LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Proce-
dure"- The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 127, 141-42 (1975).
8 See 627 S.W.2d at 41. But cf. Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d at 352,
where the Kentucky Supreme Court held that § 10 of the Kentucky Constitution imposes
more stringent standards for police inventory searches than required by the fourth amend-
ment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at
364.
29 The trial judge upheld the search on the basis of consent and probable cause plus
exigent circumstances. 627 S.W.2d at 40. The court of appeals realized that Linders" con-
sent could not be effective as to Brock's lunch box and believed that probable cause plus
exigent circumstances would not prevail in light of Bobbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420
(1981) (now overruled on the salient point by United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157
(1982)). Thus, the court in Brock found it necessary to rest its decision on a ground not re-
lied on by the trial court.
30 People v. Belton, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 578 (1980) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
31 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, the Supreme Court relied on Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1966), which focused on the officer's reasonable belief that action was necessary
for personal safety. 395 U.S. at 762. The Court went on in Chimel to say:
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to arrest has been tied to the officer's belief that such a search is
necessary to prevent the seizure of a weapon or destructible evi-
dence by the arrestee. The Kentucky court in Brock has either
overlooked this rationale or has quietly decided that Belton
simply permits an area search, regardless of either the arrestee's
ability to reach items within the area or the officer's motive for
searching.
II. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE AS A REMEDY
FOR VIOLATION OF A STATUTE
Suppression is not an appropriate remedy for the violation of
a court rule32 or statute," where the violation does not impair the
substantial rights of the defendant. On the other hand, when a
statute is designed to confer substantial rights, evidence seized in
violation of the statute arguably should be suppressed. Thus, in
Davidson v. Commonwealth-" the court of appeals held that it
was error to admit incriminating statements of two juveniles
taken after an arrest in which police failed to follow the proce-
dures set forth in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section
208.110. 5 Although the decision could have been based on other
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evi-
dence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruc-
tion. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a
weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.
395 U.S. at 763 (emphasis added). Although this language implies that the arrestee should
have the actual ability to reach the item in question, the Kentucky Supreme Court held in
Collins v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1978) that physical proximity between
the arrestee and the area searched would suffice. This is consistent with the Supreme
Court's approach in Belton. For a critical analysis of Collins, see Note, supra note 3.
32 Little v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1968); Commonwealth v. Wil-
son, 610 S.W.2d 896 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
33 Commonwealth v. Gordon, 621 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1981).
34 613 S.W.2d 431 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
" Ky. REv. STAT. § 208.110(3) (Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS] re-
quires a peace officer taking a child into custody to notify the parent or relative of this fact
and give an account of the charges against the child, the reason for the detention and the
time and place of the detention hearing.
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grounds, 38 the court of appeals read the statute as evincing a leg-
islative concern for juveniles confronted by law enforcement per-
sonnel. 37 Because the court believed the statute was enacted to
ensure that confessions were not given in ignorance of the right to
remain silent,3e suppression of evidence taken in violation of the
statute seemed the appropriate remedy.
In contrast, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Commonwealth
v. Gordon39 held it was error to suppress an out-of-court identi-
fication which was traceable to a photograph of a juvenile re-
tained by the police in violation of KRS section 208.196. 40 The
Court based its holding on the following: 1) the statute is for the
protection of juveniles and the defendant was an adult at the
time the photo was viewed by the victims; 2) the statute provides
its own remedy-misdemeanor sanctions; and 3) the statute is a
deterrent but is not constitutional in nature. 4 A juvenile does not
have a constitutional right to the confidentiality of a mug shot.
On the other hand, the statute involved in Davidson is designed
to provide notice to the parent, or other responsible person, of
the nature of the charge, the reason for detention and the time
and place of the detention hearing. 42 The court of appeals re-
garded the subject of this statute as closely tied to the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination. 43 So interpreted, the
statute implements a federal constitutional right, and suppres-
sion is an appropriate remedy. 44
-6 The court also found there was a lack of probable cause for arrest, a ground that
would invalidate a resulting confession. See Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S. Ct. 2664 (1982).
37 613 S.W.2d at 435.38 Id.
39 621 S.W.2d at 27.
40 KRS § 208.196(2) (1976) requires that physical evidence and records be surren-
dered to the court upon the elimination of the child as a suspect.
41 621 S.W.2d at 28.
42 KRS § 208.110 (1976).
43 The court referred to this as the "right to remain silent." 613 S.W.2d at 435.
44 The court quoted from In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), a case holding that a juve-
nile has a constitutional right to counsel in a proceeding in which his or her liberty may be
lost. 613 S.W.2d at 435. The Kentucky court's holding, while based on the statute, was in
response to an argument that Gault and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), require
warnings on arrest. 613 S.W.2d at 435. The United States Supreme Court has held that
Miranda warnings are required only if there is to be interrogation. Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291 (1980). There was no interrogation in Davidson.
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III. ENFORCEABILITY OF PLEA AGREEMENTS
Plea agreements are legal45 and may be enforced against the
state by specific performance, 46 at least in cases where the de-
fendant has performed and cannot be returned to the status
quo ante. 47 In Brock v. Sowders,41 the Kentucky Supreme Court
held the agreement of a local prosecutor enforceable against the
Kentucky Bureau of Corrections. The local prosecutor had
agreed that in return for a guilty plea he would recommend that
Brock receive three ten-year sentences, to run concurrently with
each other and with an Indiana sentence then being served.
Brock pled guilty, was sentenced in accord with the agreement
and was returned to Inliana to serve out his sentence in that
state. After completion of the Indiana sentence, he was brought
back to Kentucky to serve the balance of the Kentucky sentences.
At that point, the Kentucky Bureau of Corrections refused to give
credit for the time served in Indiana because of the absence of ex-
press statutory authority. Brock filed a petition for habeas cor-
pus, which was denied by the circuit court and the court of ap-
peals. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that plea agreements
must be carried out regardless of the absence of express statutory
authority. 49
On the facts, Brock stands for the proposition that a local
prosecutor's agreement, ratified by a sentencing court, is binding
on the Commonwealth of Kentucky irrespective of whether the
prosecutor went beyond his or her authority.0 If this reading of
Brock is correct, an agreement with a local prosecutor will be
binding on other prosecutors within the state. 51 The need for con-
sultation is obvious.
45 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
48 See Workman v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 206 (Ky. 1979).
47 In re Ceisser, 554 F.2d 698,706 (5th Cir. 1977).
48 610 S.W.2d 591 (Ky. 1980).
49 Id. at 592.
50 Accord Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 295-96 (2d
Cir. 1976); see generally Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies.for Broken
Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 471,531-34 (1978).
51 See United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972).
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IV. PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
Both the United States52 and Kentucky-3 Constitutions have
been interpreted as providing a public right of access to trials.
The public and the media may not be denied access to trial pro-
ceedings without a particularized showing that closure is neces-
sary to protect the defendant, or vindicate a legitimate state in-
terest.- The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled,
however, that the press or public have a constitutional right of
access to pre-trial proceedings.5 In the important case of Ashland
Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 57 a panel of the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals held that sections 8,8 11, 59 and 1460 of the Kentucky Consti-
5 2 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) ("[tlhe
right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment").
53 See Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749, 751-52 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980) (interpreting Ky. CONST. § 14 which states, "All courts shall be open."). See also
Herald-Leader Co., Inc. v. Tackett, 601 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1980); Johnson v. Simpson, 433
S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1968).
54 448 U.S. at 581.
55 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982) (error to close
proceedings during testimony of minor rape victims without a showing that the victims
were unwilling to testify'in the presence of the press); Lexington Herald-Leader Co., Inc.
v. Tackett, 601 S.W.2d at 905 (embarrassment and emotional trauma to minor victims
who testify is insufficient to warrant closing a trial to ihe entire public).
'6 Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,392-93 (1979).
57 612 S.W.2d at 749.
5 Ky. CONST. § 8 states:
Printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the
proceedings of the General Assembly or any branch of government, and no
law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. Every person may freely
and fully speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the
abuse of that liberty.
59 Ky. CONST. § 11 states:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be heard by
himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor. He can not be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself, nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property,
unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land; and in prosecu-
tions by indictment or information, he shall have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the vicinage; but the general assembly may provide by a
general law for a change of venue in such prosecutions for beth the defen-
dant and the Commonwealth, the change to be made to the most convenient
county in which a fair trial can be obtained.
60 Ky. CONST. § 14 states: "All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay."
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tution-viewed in the context of a tradition of accessibility-
create a constitutional right of access to pre-trial hearings, as
well as to trials.,1 The court held it was error for the trial judge to
enter an order excluding the press and public from pre-trial hear-
ings in the absence of a showing that closure was necessary to
protect the defendant.62
The court went on to set guidelines for the handling of re-
quests to close pre-trial hearings. The proceeding should not be
closed unless the judge concludes "that there is a substantial
probability [that] the right of the accused to a fair trial or his
other Constitutional rights will be irreparably damaged."s Pre-
sumably, a judge also may consider legitimate state interests,
such as the identity of an informer. 4 If the expected evidence at
the pre-trial hearing is not generally known, the judge should
consider closure when the evidence is of a kind that would be in-
admissible at trial. The judge should consider the likelihood that
the pre-trial hearing would not be reported in the media, be-
cause not every criminal case is a "cause cel~bre."' ' In any case in
which closure is requested, the judge should give the press and
public a right to be heard, consider the utility of other means of
protecting the defendant and make specific findings setting out
the need for closure.6
Ashland Publishing Co. is an excellent decision. The public
has an interest in being informed about the operation of the
criminal justice system. Extending the right of access to pre-trial
hearings advances that interest because most criminal cases are
disposed of without trial.67
61 612 S.W.2d at 751-52.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 753.
64 Lexington Herald-Leader Co., Inc. v. Tackett, 601 S.W.2d at 907.
65 612 S.W.2d at 752. The court discounted voir dire and change of venue as effec-
tive safeguards against prejudicial pre-trial publicity. Id. at 752-53. The court mentioned
a motion to suppress as the most obvious example of a hearing involving evidence which
would be inadmissible at trial. Other common examples are bail hearings and competency
proceedings.
61 Id. at 753.
67 United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556-57 (3d Cir. 1982).
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V. JOINDER AND SEVERANCE
In Hubbard v. Commonwealth,68 defendant Hubbard was
indicted for burglary, theft and possession of a handgun by a
convicted felon, following the theft of an automobile from a
dealer's garage. The charge of possessing a firearm after having
been convicted of a felony centered on a handgun which fell out
of the car when the vehicle was stopped by the police. Both
Hubbard and a passenger in the car identified the firearm as be-
longing to the passenger. 6
Prior to trial, Hubbard moved for a separate trial on the
felon in possession charge, pointing out that he would be preju-
diced in defending against the burglary and theft charges by the
introduction of his previous felony conviction. The trial court de-
nied the motion for severance, and Hubbard was subjected to
trial on all charges. The prior felony conviction was admitted,
ostensibly to prove the felon in possession charge. Hubbard was
acquitted on that count but convicted of the burglary. 70
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the trial judge abused his discretion in not granting a sep-
arate trial on the felon in possession charge. The Court stated:
RCr 9.16 provides that if it appears that either the Com-
monwealth or the defendant will be prejudiced by a joint trial
of separate offenses they shall be tried separately. This case is a
perfect example of when a severance should be granted. The
two-stage proceeding in persistent felony-offender cases was
designed for the specific purpose of obviating the prejudice
that necessarily results from a jury's knowledge of previous
convictions while it is weighing the guilt or innocence of a de-
fendant on another charge. Cf. KRS 532.080(1), enacted in
1974.71
The reasoning in Hubbard is sound. Prejudice invariably re-
sults from the introduction of evidence of a felony conviction. If
the conviction is admissible on one count and inadmissible on a
633 S.W.2d 67 (Ky. 1982).





second count of a multi-count indictment, a motion to sever
should always be granted. 72
VI. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
The test for competency to stand trial is whether the accused
"as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to appre-
ciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him
or [is unable] to participate rationally in his own defense." 73 If a
defendant has a poor memory, it can be argued that he is incom-
petent to stand trial because he cannot participate in his own de-
fense-he cannot tell his attorney what occurred, assist in the
location of witnesses, testify to the events in question or assist in
challenging prosecution witnesses. 74
Although the Kentucky high court held in 1972 that occa-
sional lapses of memory do not necessarily render an individual
incompetent for trial,75 the Court did not speak definitively on
the issue of amnesia until the 1981 decision of Commonwealth v.
Griffin.76 In Griffin, the Court reversed the court of appeals
which had upheld the trial court's finding of incompetency. The
Court found that the trial judge abused his discretion in declar-
ing incompetent a defendant whose medically-certified lack of
memory prevented him from assisting his attorney at trial.77 Re-
versing, the Court said: "We reject amnesia by virtue of mental
72 Although the question of severance is generally within the discretion of the trial
court, Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1976), the Court recently held it
error to require a defendant to present inconsistent defenses to counts of a multi-count in-
dictment before the same jury. In Romans v. Commonwealth, 547 S.W.2d 128 (Ky.
1977), the defendant was indicted on two counts of rape, involving different victims.
Joinder was proper under Ky. R. CluM. P. 6.18 [hereafter cited as RCr], because the acts
were of the same character. The accused defended count one on consent and count two on
mistaken identity. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the charges ought not to be
tried together. Id. at 131.
73 KRS § 504.040 (1975). Accord Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Com-
monwealth v. Strickland, 375 S.W.2d 701 (1964).
74 See the trial judge's findings as reported in Commonwealth v. Griffin, 622
S.W.2d 214, 215 (Ky. 1981); S. SHAH, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRAL AND MENTAL ILLNESS
101-03 (1974).
75 Dye v. Commonwealth, 477 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1972), affd sub nom. Dye v.
Cowan, 472 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir. 1972).
76 622 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1981).
77 Id. at 215-16.
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disease or otherwise as a basis for declaring an accused incompe-
tent to stand trial. This holding includes partial loss of memory
or distorted memory of events at the time of commission of a
crime." 8
To answer the contention that lack of memory puts the de-
fense at a considerable disadvantage, the Court suggested that in
a case of medically-confirmed amnesia the trial court could order
the prosecution to open its files to the defendant. 79 In this way,
defense counsel could be better apprised of the historical facts.
The Court gratuitiously stated that "[f]oss of memory due to self-
induced intoxication would not warrant an order opening prose-
cution files to the defendant."8
Griffin is a remarkable example of judicial insensitivity to-
ward the accused and defense counsel. The right to effective as-
sistance of counsel includes the right to effective investigation.8'
When a defense attorney is unable to investigate the facts be-
cause of a client's loss of memory, for whatever reason,82 the trial
court should require the prosecution to cooperate fully in assist-
ing the defense attorney in reconstructing the historical facts. On
a sufficient showing of need,83 the trial court should authorize
payment of the fee of a hypnotist when expert testimony holds
out the hope that hypnosis may unlock the accused's memory. 4
If amnesia persists at trial, the judge should fashion substi-
tutes for the assistance the accused would ordinarily have pro-
vided to defense counsel. For example, the court could permit
78 Id. at 217.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See STANDARDS-THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.2 (1980), which provides that as
"soon as practicable the lawyer should seek to determine all relevant facts known to the ac-
cused." Further, it "is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the cir-
cumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of
the case and the penalty in the event of conviction." Id. § 4.1.82 According to the opinion in Griffin, loss of memory as the result of self-induced in-
toxication would not warrant opening the prosecution files. 622 S.W.2d at 217. The plight
of defense counsel is the same whatever the reason for the loss of memory.
83 KRS § 31.100 (1980) defines a "needy person" as one who is "unable to provide for
the payment of an attorney and all other necessary expenses of representation."
84 KRS § 31.110(1)(b) (1980); cf. Note, Amnesia: A Case Study in the Limits of Par-
ticular justice, 71 YALE L.J. 109, 120 (1961).
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defense counsel a limited examination, outside the hearing of the
jury, of any witness who had refused to talk to defense counsel
prior to trial. The court should be generous in considering de-
fense requests for continuances.
Finally, in the event of a conviction, the court should con-
sider whether the proceeding was fair. In Wilson v. United
States,8 Judge Skelley Wright of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia said the trial court should make specific
written findings, after an evidentiary hearing if necessary, con-
sidering the following factors:
(1) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defen-
dant's ability to consult with and assist his lawyer.
(2) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defen-
dant's ability to testify in his own behalf.
(3) The extent to which the evidence in suit could be ex-
trinsically reconstructed in view of the defendant's amnesia.
Such evidence would include evidence relating to the crime it-
self as well as any reasonably possible alibi.
(4) The extent to which the Government assisted the de-
fendant and his counsel in that reconstruction.
(5) The strength of the prosecution's case. Most important
here will be whether the Government's case is such as to negate
all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. If there is any substan-
tial possibility that the accused could, but for his amnesia, es-
tablish an alibi or other defense, it should be presumed that he
would have been able to do so.
(6) Any other facts and circumstances which would in-
dicate whether or not the defendant had a fair trial.86
After finding the facts, the court should determine whether the
trial was fair. If so, the conviction should stand. If not, the court
should decide whether to dismiss the indictment or give the state
an opportunity to attempt to eliminate the unfairness in a re-
trial.7
Justice Stephenson's opinion for the Kentucky Court in Grif-
fin compares unfavorably with that of Judge Wright in Wilson.
8' 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
86 Id. at 463-64 (footnote omitted).
'7 Id. at 464.
1982-83]
KENTucKy LAW JouRNAL
To flatly hold that amnesia does not render a person unfit for
trial overlooks the problems that poor memory presents for de-
fense counsel. Needless to say, a trial judge is not required to be-
lieve an accused's claim of loss of memory. At a competency
hearing, the trial judge may choose whom to believe. In Griffin,
however, the accused presented a verified history of mental ill-
ness and the trial judge found the loss of memory to be genuine.
VII. IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Due process is violated by the admission of identification evi-
dence where there is a substantial chance of misidentification as
a result of unnecessarily suggestive procedures.M In Riley v.
Commonwealth,8 the Kentucky Supreme Court was faced with
an identification procedure which was not only extremely sug-
gestive, but also reached the.limit of what may be required of an
accused without violating the right to a fair trail.
The clerk of a store robbed by two masked men (one tall, one
short) provided general descriptions of the robbers, who were
armed with handguns. Soon after the robbery, Holland and
Riley were apprehended. Apparently, they had guns in their pos-
session; clothing matching that used by the robbers (two scarves
and a trenchcoat) was found nearby. After the arrest, Holland
and Riley were exhibited to the clerk, who failed to identify them
as the robbers. She also failed to identify their photos and failed
to identify Riley at a preliminary hearing.0
At trial, the judge ordered Holland and Riley to act out the
robbery before the jury to determine if the clerk could identify
them. Riley was forced to put on the black silk scarf, take the .38
caliber revolver, stand near the clerk and say the words spoken
by the taller robber. Holland was required to put on the black
trench coat and mask and place the black handgun in the waist-
band of his trousers. After this staging, the clerk identified Hol-
land and Riley as the robbers, and they were convicted. 91
88 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110-14 (1977).
89 620 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1981).
90 Id. at 317.
9' Id. at 317-18.
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On appeal, the Court applied the factors 2 set out in Neil v.
Biggers93 and found that the "dress rehearsal held before the jury,
when considered in light of the totality of the circumstanbes, was
so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mis-
taken identity that movant was denied due process." 4 The Court
was obviously impressed by the failure of the clerk to identify
Riley on three previous occasions and the fact that the clerk was
not asked to make an in-court identification until Riley and Hol-
land were clad in the robbers' garb. The conclusion reached was
that the clerk identified the clothes rather than the people in the
clothes.9
Even in the absence of a substantial chance of misidentifica-
tion, forcing an accused to don a mask, brandish a gun and utter
threats in the presence of the jury seems inimical to a fair trial.M
92 Id. at 318. These are:
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime, (2) the witness' degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness'
prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the
crime and the confrontation.
93 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
94 620 S.W.2d at 319.
95 Id.
96 In Pena v. State, 630 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981), the trial court forced
the accused to put on a ski mask and gloves, not for purposes of identification, but to bol-
ster the officer's testimony that he was frightened when confronted by the accused. The
court found this was reversible error. But cJ. People v. Holt, 104 Cal. Rptr. 572, 578-79
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied 413 U.S. 921 (1973), overruled, Evans v. Superior Ct.,
522 P.2d 681, 686 n.6 (1974) (overruled Holt only insofar as inconsistent with Evans) (not
error to require accused to brandish gun and utter words said by robber, rejecting claims
of misidentification and violation of the privilege against self-incrimination; no claim was
made that the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value of the evidence).
The privilege against self-incrimination is implicated if the accused is compelled
to perform some communicative or testimonial act. Thus, in Serratore v. People, 497 P.2d
1018, 1022 (Colo. 1972), overruled sub. nom, People v. Ramirez, 609 P.2d 616, 621 n.9
(Colo. 1980) (overruled only insofar as Ramirez limits Serratore to courtroom demonstra-
tions), the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a conviction where the prosecutor had
sought, in open court, to compel the accused, a man only four-foot-ten-inches tall, to try
to place his thumb print on a stove five-foot-seven-inches off the floor. The court viewed
this as the equivalent of asking the accused if he could reach the spot.
Requiring the accused to speak or otherwise exhibit physical characteristics does
not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967); Francis v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1971).
For a comprehensive annotation of cases involving the propriety of requiring a de-
fendant to perform an act in the presence of the jury, see Annot., 3 A.L.R. 4th 367 (1981).
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Such a procedure vests the accused, as the actor, with the charac-
teristics of the role he is given to play. If the ability of a witness to
identify depends upon seeing and hearing an individual imitating
the criminal, the identification should take place before trial in a
properly conducted lineup.97 Nothing supports forcing the ac-
cused to accept the starring role in a re-creation of the crime for
an audience of twelve jurors. 9
VIII. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Kentucky prosecutors do not have the inherent power to
grant immunity to witnesses to compel testimony.99 Common-
wealth v. Gettys'00 illustrates the difficulties this lack of authority
presents for a prosecutor whose case depends upon a reluctant
witness. The defendant Gettys and an individual named Sch-
worer were indicted for bribery. Though the opinion is not ex-
plicit, a plea bargain apparently was struck whereby Schworer
would testify against Gettys in return for a light sentence on an
amended charge. 01 Schworer apparently reneged on the bar-
gain. He pled guilty to an amended charge with sentencing de-
ferred until after the Gettys trial. When called as the state's first
witness, however, Schworer invoked the privilege against self-in-
crimination. The trial judge ruled that the privilege could still be
claimed since Schworer had not been sentenced and might with-
draw his guilty plea. At this point, a recess was called and
Schworer was sentenced to a term in the county jail.102
After sentencing, the trial judge ruled that Schworer was not
entitled to claim the privilege with regard to the Gettys bribe.
Schworer persisted in his refusal to testify, asserting that he had
97 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 218. A properly conducted lineup will lessen
the chances of a witness misidentifying the defendant. On a proper showing by the defen-
dant a trial court should order the prosecution to conduct a pre-trial lineup. Evans v.
Superior Court, 522 P.2d at 681.
98 However, if the defendant chooses to testify in his own behalf, he may be required
to demonstrate as part of cross-examination. Fox v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.2d 394, 398
(Ky. 1945).
99 Commonwealth v. Brown, 619 S.W.2d at 699.
100 610 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).




testified before the grand jury that he had made no campaign
contributions to anyone, while another witness testified he had
received $500 from Schworer. Thus, it was argued, Schworer
might be indicted for perjury if he were to testify differently on
this collateral matter. Gettys' attorney stated that he intended to
ask Schworer about the $500 payment.'
Over the state's objection, the court ruled that cross-exam-
ination as to the $500 campaign payment would be proper and
that Schworer was entitled to claim the privilege against self-in-
crimination with respect to the payment. The court then de-
clared that Schworer could not be compelled to testify at all, pre-
sumably because the judge believed Gettys' right of cross-exam-
ination required that Schworer answer questions about the $500
payment. A verdict was directed for the defendant Gettys and
the law was certified to the court of appeals. 14 On appeal, the
court held that a trial judge faced with this dilemma should en-
deavor
[first] to make a thorough examination of the questions to be
asked to determine whether or not responsive answers would
be incriminating. Second, the trial court must determine, tak-
ing into account any peculiar facts known to it, what crimes
might reasonably be anticipated to be elicited by responsive
answers on the part of the witness claiming the privilege. 105
The prosecutor should frame the questions as narrowly as
possible, °6 and the judge should consider all information offered
by the parties to determine whether an anticipated answer might
provide a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the
witness for a crime.107
In Gettys, the court of appeals went on to say that the alleged
$500 campaign contribution was collateral to the Gettys bribe,
that the trial judge should have ruled cross-examination on that
104 Id.
'
0 Id. at 901.
06 See, e.g., Arnett v. Meade, 462 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Ky. 1971) (the specific ques-
tions asked by the prosecutor set out the story of the crime, assuming a "yes" answer to
each question).
107 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1951).
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matter to be improper and therefore the claim of the privilege in
the bribery proceedings as to the $500 payment should not have
been sustained.l"' On this point, the court of appeals seems to be
in error. If Schworer had testified against Gettys, it would have
been clearly relevant to cross-examine him about his motives for
implicating Gettys. That the prosecution could have charged
Schworer with perjury and another count of bribery and did not
do so is a factor a jury should be able to consider in deciding what
weight to give Schworer's testimony.I19
In certifying the law, the court should have dealt with the
issue of waiver, a matter not argued before the trial court and
therefore not considered by the court of appeals. Schworer testi-
fied before the grand jury about the $500 payment. He then as-
serted the privilege against self-incrimination at Gettys' trial, ap-
parently claiming that his testimony about the payment would
provide evidence that he committed perjury before the grand
jury.10 Whether a false answer before a grand jury gives rise to a
privilege not to answer truthfully concerning the subject of the
prior inquiry is a question that should be judicially answered.
The courts need to fashion a response to this problem which will
protect the witness while providing a means to compel testi-
mony.111 A witness should not be able to immunize trial testi-
mony by giving false testimony before a grand jury."2
108 610 S.W.2d at 901.
109 Barrett v. Commonwealth, 608 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1980), is the most recent
example of a reversal of a conviction because of a curtailment of cross-examination. In
Barrett the Court relied on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), which stands for the
proposition that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment guarantees the right to
cross-examine a witness as to his possible motivation for testifying falsely. 608 S.W.2d at
376.
110 610 S.W.2d at 900.
111 In State v. De Cola, 164 A.2d 729, 738 (N.J. 1960), the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that, in such a situation, the testimony could be compelled, but that such testi-
mony could not be used in a perjury prosecution. The court reasoned that it was not over-
stepping its authority by creating an immunity, but rather was giving meaning to the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. De Cola is criticized in C. MCCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 294 (1972).
112 A related question is whether the witness waives the privilege as to the underlying
events by giving testimony before the grand jury. The Kentucky Court held in Galloway




Gettys illustrates the ability of a witness to frustrate the
truth-finding process by abuse of the privilege against self-in-
crirnination. A general immunity statute should be enacted by
the Kentucky legislature to meet this problem. 3
IX. ORDER OF PROOF
The Kentucky high court has previously condemned the
practice of a prosecutor holding back substantial evidence for in-
troduction in rebuttal after the defense has rested.14 In Gilbert v.
Commonwealth,15 the Court reversed a conviction where the
prosecutor had been permitted to introduce a taped confession
under the guise of rebutting the defendant's denial of guilt. In re-
versing, the Court said that an admonition that the tape should
be considered only for the purpose of contradiction could not
cure the prejudice to the defendant. 6 The "prejudice" in Gilbert
was that the defendant made the decision to testify, and did tes-
tify, in ignorance of the devastating evidence the state pos-
sessed."17 Thus, he was branded a liar by the introduction of the
tape, a factor perhaps reflected in the relatively harsh sentence
given by the jury." 8 The opinion in Gilbert reflects the Court's
concern that the prosecution play by the rules"9 and introduce its
evidence in chief first, that the defendant then have an opportu-
nity to present evidence and that evidence thereafter be truly in
the nature of rebuttal.
13 In Commonwealth v. Brown, 619 S.W.2d at 699, the Court made it clear that
the question of immunity is a legislative matter, that neither a prosecutor nor a judge has
the power to grant immunity absent statutory authority. An immunity bill was introduced
in the 1982 Kentucky General Assembly, but was not enacted. S. 45,1982 Ky. General As-
sembly.
114 Archer v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Ky. 1971); Collier v. Com-
monwealth, 339 S.W.2d 167,168 (Ky. 1960).
"I 633 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1982).
16 Id. at 71.
117 The defendant was charged with rape of an eleven-year-old girl. In a taped inter-
view with a state police officer, in questions and answers couched in street language, he
admitted having intercourse with the child. Id. at 70.
118 He was sentenced to 40 years in the penitentiary. Id. at 69.
119 RCr 9.43 (1978) sets out the order of proof.
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X. INSTRUCTING IN THE ALTERNATIVE
Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution requires a unanimous
verdict in criminal cases.2 ° In 1978, the Kentucky Supreme
Court was confronted with the question of "whether a verdict is
unanimous if jurors are split in their belief as to which of two al-
ternative elements the evidence establishes when proof of either
element alone would justify the convictions."'21 The defendant
was charged with first degree assault and the jury was instructed
that it could find the defendant guilty if he intended to cause,,
serious physical injury or if he wantonly engaged in conduct
creating a grave risk of death. Thus, some members of the jury
might have believed that his actions were intentional while other
jurors believed his conduct to be wanton.12 In Wells v. Com-
monwealth,24 the Court affirmed the conviction and, in so do-
ing, held that the constitutional requirement of unanimity is not
violated by instructing in the alternative so long as both alterna-
tives are supported by the evidence. 24
In Boulder v. Commonwealth'24 and Hayes v. Common-
wealth,24 the Court applied Wells and reversed convictions
where one of the alternatives was without evidentiary support.
In both cases, the alternative instructions permitted a verdict of
guilty on a finding of intentional action or wanton conduct.M
The Court, in reversing the convictions, held that in neither case
did the evidence support a finding that the conduct was other
than intentional.121 Thus, it was error to instruct the jury on wan-
tonness.
XI. DENYING THE JURY INFORMATION ABOUT
THE CONSEQUENCES OF A VERDICT
In Payne v. Commonwealth,l2 - the Court held that a jury
charged with the responsibility of sentencing cannot be informed
120 Ky. CONST. § 7.
121 Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85,87 (Ky. 1978).
122 Id. at 87.
123 Id. at 85.
124 Id. at 88.
11- 610 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1980).
'2 625 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1981).
127 Id. at 584; 610 S.W.2d at 617.
12 625 S.W.2d at 588; 610 S.W.2d at 617.
119 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981).
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about the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity. Overruling cases that permitted comment but not evi-
dence,' 30 the Court held that "neither the prosecutor, defense
counsel, nor the court may make any comment about the conse-
quences of a particular verdict at any time during a criminal
trial."'' No mention is to be made of "treatment, civil commit-
ment, probation, shock probation [or] parole," for consideration
of those factors may "distort" the jury's finding of fact. 32
The 1982 legislature created the verdict of "guilty but men-
tally ill."' If mental illness becomes an issue at trial, the jury
will have four possible verdicts-not guilty, guilty, not guilty by
reason of insanity and guilty but mentally illW4-and, pursuant
to Payne, it would be error for anyone to tell the jury what may
happen to the accused under any of the verdicts. The Supreme
Court expressed a normative standard for jury behavior-the
jury is to concern itself only with the offense and the defendant's
responsibility for his behavior. ', For example, it is error to tell
the jury that a verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not insure
treatment'36 or that the judge must initiate civil commitment pro-
ceedings after a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.137 This
author believes that jurors cannot decide cases without consider-
ation of the effect of a decision, that jurors now decide cases on
the basis of speculation and inaccurate information and that
forcing speculative, misinformed decisions is unfair to jurors and
litigants.
A related issue is that of withholding from the jury informa-
tion relevant to fixing a sentence. Although the constitutional
130 Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. 1980); Jewell v. Commbnwealth,
549 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1977).
13 623 S.W.2d at 870.
132 Id.
'33 KRS § 504.120 (Supp. 1982).
134 Id.
135 623 S.W.2d at 870.
136 The judge is to order treatment only if he or she finds the defendant mentally ill
at the time of sentencing. KRS § 504.150 (Cum. Supp. 1982). The jury is to determine
mental illness at the time of the offense. KES § 504.120 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
137 KRS § 504.030 (Supp. 1982).
1982-83]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
right to trial by jury is limited to the determination of guilt or
innocence,"' the rules of criminal procedure provide for jury sen-
tencing on a jury finding of guilt."' The jury must fix the term of
imprisonment within the penalty range set by law.4 0 The jury is
forced to sentence solely on its knowledge of the offense' and
whatever incidental information is learned about the defendant
if he or she testifies. The jury is denied the information in fixing
sentence that the legislature has said the judge must consider in
imposing sentence. 42
Since the trial judge can reduce the sentence within the
penalty range, 43 run sentences consecutively or concurrently'"4
and grant probation, 4 5 the jury's sentence merely fixes a max-
imum term of imprisonment. The judge, and later the parole
board, 46 may mitigate the sentence after evaluation of the indi-
vidual; thus, defendants are generally not harmed by the present
system of jury sentencing. The harm is to the system, for jurors
are required to fix sentence while knowing little about the defen-
dant. If jurors are to continue4 7 to perform the function of fixing
sentence, the rules should be changed to provide for a bifurcated
trial, with the jury given all relevant information in the penalty
phase.
XII. BELATED APPEALS
The issue of reinstatement of an appeal continues to bedevil
the Kentucky appellate courts. In Hammershoy v. Common-
'1 Perry v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. 1966); Allison v. Gray, 296
S.W.2d 735 (Ky. 1956).
'39 RCr 9.84 (1963).
140 KRS § 532.060 (1975) sets out the penalty ranges.
141 White v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (not error
for the trial court to refuse to allow mitigating evidence during the persistent felony of-
fender stage of a proceeding, since the jury's "only" decision was to determine status). In
addition to determining status, the jury, of course, has to fix a penalty within the penalty
range. KRS § 532.080 (Supp. 1982).
142 KRS § 532.050 (1975).
1'3 KRS § 532.070 (1975).
144 KRS § 532.110(1) (1975).
145 KRS §§ 532.040 (1975), 533.020 (1975) & 439.265 (1982).
146 KRS § 439.340 (Supp. 1982).
147 In 1981, the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected a proposal to change to judge sen-
tencing. Fortune, Criminal Rules, 70 Ky. L.J. 395, 396 (1981-82).
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wealth, 8 the Kentucky high court held that a trial court erred in
refusing to vacate a sentence for the purpose of granting the de-
fendant a belated appeal. His appointed attorney had filed a
notice of appeal, but had taken no further steps to perfect the ap-
peal, apparently because he believed there was no meritorious
issue to present. 149
Twelve years after Hammershoy, the Court decided Cleaver
v. Commonwealth. 1s Without overruling Hammershoy the
Court held that a trial court has no authorty to reinstate an ap-
peal which had been dismissed by the Supreme Court. "A right
to a belated appeal, or to reinstate a lapsed appeal, can be
granted only by the appellate court that is to entertain it."'1'
Because Hammershoy had not been explicitly overruled, one
panel of the court of appeals read Cleaver as limited to cases of
dismissed appeals; belated appeals, said the court, were still gov-
erned by Hammershoy. 152 Whether this reading of Cleaver was
justified is questionable in light of the language of Cleaver'5 and
other cases's following that decision.
In 1981, in an unsigned opinion and without explanation,
the Supreme Court undercut Cleaver. In Stahl v. Common-
wealth,'5 a timely notice of appeal was filed with the Supreme
Court. The Court dismissed the appeal for failure to file a brief.
At this juncture the defendant, disregarding the command of
Cleaver, filed a RCr 11.42 motion in the trial court, seeking the
reinstatement of his appeal or a new trial. The trial court ordered
a new trial and the Commonwealth appealed. The court of ap-
peals reversed and the defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court. 1
148 398 S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1966).
149 Id. at 884.
15o 569 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1978). See Collier, Criminal Procedure, 68 Ky. L.J. 655,
665-74 (1979-80), for a discussion of the case.
'' 569 S.W.2d at 169.
152 593 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
'5' 569 S.W.2d at 169.
154 Gregory v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1978); Amburgey v. Com-
monwealth, 579 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
'- 613 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1981).
'5 Id. at 618.
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The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and rein-
stated the order of the trial court. The Court cited both Cleaver
and Hammershoy with approval: Cleaver for the proposition
that only an appellate court could consider a belated or lapsed
appeal, Hammershoy for the proposition that a motion to the
trial court is the proper remedy for a "frustrated" right of ap-
peal.Is The Court did not explain the difference between belated
or lapsed appeals and frustrated appeals.
Although the trial court order had been for a new trial (per-
haps in an attempt to avoid the Cleaver rule), the Supreme Court
made it clear that the trial court could consider issues of fact
which might have caused ineffective assistance of counsel at the
appellate level, and that if it found such to exist, the proper rem-
edy would be to vacate the order of conviction and enter a new
judgment from which a new appeal would lie. 1' The distinction
between such an order and the order soundly condemned in
Gregory v. Commonwealth'9 on similar facts is paper thin.
XIII. POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
In Commonwealth v. Ivey,' 60 the Court held that KRS sec-
tion 31.110 requires the appointment of counsel to assist in the
preparation of a RCr 11.42 petition. The Court reconciled ap-
parently conflicting provisions of KRS section 31.110161 and RCr
11.42162 by treating the criminal rule as setting a minimum stand-
ard for the appointment of counsel, and the statute as a legisla-
tive decision that indigents deserve a more generous policy.'63
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 574 S.W.2d at 309 (The circuit court in which the defendant was convicted had
no jurisdiction to reinstate the defendant's right to a direct appeal; only the appellate bourt
that is to entertain the appeal can grant the right to a belated appeal).
160 599 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1980); see Collier, supra note 150, at 660-63, for a discus-
sion of this decision.
161 KRS § 31.110(2) (1980) provides that "[a] needy person... is entitled ... (c)
[t]o be represented in any other post-conviction proceeding that the attorney and the
needy person considers appropriate."
162 RCr 11.42(5) provides for the appointment of counsel if the petition and answer
raise an issue of fact that cannot be resolved on the record, necessitating an evidentiary
hearing.
1'6 599 S.W.2d at 457.
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The Court in Ivey emphasized the fact that a poorly drafted R(r
11.42 petition could be fatal to meritorious claims.'"
In Ray v. Commonwealth,' the court of appeals applied
Ivey to the following facts. In 1969, Ray was convicted of two
felonies and received a five-year sentence of imprisonment. In
1980, he was tried on another charge, convicted, and the 1969
convictions were then used to enhance the sentence in a persis-
tent felony offender proceeding. In 1981, Ray filed a CR 60.02'6
motion seeking to vacate the 1969 convictions on the ground that
his guilty pleas were not obtained in compliance with Boykin v.
Alabama. 117 With the CR 60.02 motion, Ray asked for the assis-
tance of counsel. When the trial court refused to appoint counsel
and denied the CR 60.02 motion, Ray appealed.
The court of appeals held that Ray was not entitled to coun-
sel at state expense because he was not being detained on the
1969 convictions, but rather on the 1980 persistent felony of-
fender conviction. 168 The court then passed to the merits of the
CR 60.02 claim. In holding that the trial court properly denied
relief, the court of appeals pointed out that CR 60.02 motions
must advance reasons of an extraordinary nature justifying relief
and must be made within a reasonable time. The movant ad-
vanced no reason why he had not attacked the 1969 convictions
at an earlier date. 169
Although Ray correctly applies CR 60.02, the court's grudg-
ing construction of KRS section 31.110 seems inconsistent with
Ivey. Ray's 1980 persistent felony offender sentence, as a practi-
cal matter, was the product of the 1969 convictions and the
underlying substantive conviction in 1980. Ray's custody status
164 Id. at 458.
165 633 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
16 CR 60.02 provides for relief from final judgments on a showing of newly dis-
covered evidence, fraud or other equitable grounds, including that alleged in Ray: "Any
other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief." CR 60.02(6). Civil rules applica-
ble before the promulgation of the rules of criminal procedure and not superseded by the
criminal rules may still be relied on in criminal cases. RCr 13.04.
167 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The Boykin Court held that an intelligent waiver of the
right to a trial cannot be presumed from a silent record.
168 633 S.W.2d at 72.
169 Id. at 73.
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was as much the result of what happened in 1969 as what hap-
pened in 1980.
In 1981, the availability of RCr 11.42 as a means of attacking
a conviction was extended to those on probation, parole or condi-
tional discharge.170 KRS section 31.110, however, does not pro-
vide for the appointment of counsel for one who is not in deten-
tion and not under formal charges.' 7' Thus, an indigent convict
who is not in detention will not be entitled to the appointment of
counsel in the preparation of a RCr 11.42 petition, though he
will be entitled to the appointment of counsel if the court sched-
ules a hearing on the petition. This result seems clearly inconsis-
tent with Ivey, where the Kentucky Supreme Court emphasized
the need for careful preparation of RCr 11.42 petitions fo guard
against the inadvertent omission of valid grounds for voiding a
conviction. 72
170 RCr 11.42(1).
171 KRS S 31.110(1) (Supp. 1982).
172 599 S.W.2d at 457-58.
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